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This paper questions the current emphases in innovation policy on a particular 
interpretation of US performance which emphasises R&D intensive high technology 
producing sectors, spin-offs from the science base and private sector venture capital. 
Whilst recognizing the important role they may play it is argued that it has been greatly 
exaggerated to the neglect of other key factors. One is the importance of the diffusion and 
use of ICT as a general purpose technology beyond the ICT and other R&D intensive 
high-tech producing sectors. A second is the dominant role which performance 
transformation in existing firms plays in driving industry level productivity compared 
with the direct role of new entrants. A third is the diversified role played by universities 
in knowledge exchange which extends beyond a narrow focus on spin offs and licensing 
to encompass the creation of human capital and a wide range of formal and informal 
business interactions. Finally there is the major role that public R&D procurement policy 
has played in the US in the effective provision of public rather than private sector venture 
capital. The paper provides a broad overview of evidence on each of these factors and 
considers some broad implications for innovation policy which might be drawn on the 
basis of that review. In particular it concludes by arguing that the crafting of innovation 
policy in the context of any specific national innovation system requires a careful 
consideration of the structural features of that context and the particular opportunities and 
challenges facing policy practitioners in it. An imperfect interpretation of the experience 
of one country’s system is unlikely to be an appropriate guide to innovation system 
failure or success elsewhere. 
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In the immediate post-World War II years a series of millenarian movements 
known as cargo cults
1 swept through Melanesia. They emerged in the aftermath 
of intensive American contact in the course of the Second World War. These 
contacts led to a substantial increase in the material goods available to 
Melanesian islanders, but the end of the War meant that such material goods 
became less available as military withdrawal occurred. In these circumstances 
cargo cults emerged in which prophets would promise the return of cargoes of 
material goods by their ancestors (often expected to take the form of the 
Americans) with cargo typically shipped in the airplanes which had been such a 
common feature of the war experience. The means by which the return of the 
cargo was to be encouraged varied between different cults in different islands, 
but frequently involved the ritual preparation and construction of a variety of 
structures such as airfields, storage facilities, landing strips and associated 
paraphernalia. Cult members were encouraged to abandon previous cultural 
practices and often mimicked the behavioural characteristics of Americans 
(Worsley (1957), Jarvie (1964)). The emergence of these cults did not lead to 
the return of material cargo.  
 
There is in my view a danger today that the evolution of innovation policy 
structures based on copying perceived cultural characteristics and structures of 
the US innovation system will also fail to deliver the goods. In the case of 
innovation policy the cargo is improved economic welfare through improved 
productivity growth based on enhanced innovation performance. The key 
“ritual” structures are increased R&D expenditures; an emphasis upon the 
commercialisation of science through university based spinouts and licensing 
routes in high technology producing sectors; the promotion of entrepreneurship 
and new business entry and a supposed US entrepreneurial culture based on the 
subsidisation of risk taking in venture capital investment and of the 
development of the SME sector more generally. 
 
These perceived key elements feature centrally in policy debates. For example 
in March 2000 the EU adopted the “Lisbon” strategy to make, within the next 
decade, the EU the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy 
in the world. The strategy was explicitly positioned as a response to the 
observed superior performance of the US economy which had in the previous 
decade substantially outperformed the European economies. It also explicitly 
accepted the view that this superior US economic performance was based on the 
emergence of high technology sectors such as ICT and biotechnology as key 
totems of the new knowledge-based economy of the US (European Commission 
(2004)). Despite the subsequent bursting of the dot.com bubble and an 
increased awareness of the emerging threat to Europe from India and China 
rather than the US these key elements of the innovation and technology strategy   2
connected with Lisbon continue to be emphasized. Thus, in 2004, it was 
asserted that  
 
“There is overwhelming evidence of the vital importance of boosting R&D as a 
prerequisite for Europe to become more competitive. To fail to act on that 
evidence would be a fundamental strategic error …” 
European Commission (2004) p.21 
 
Similarly, it was asserted that entrepreneurship is required to take advantage of 
technological developments 
 
“Increasingly, new firms and SMEs are the major sources of growth and new 
jobs. Entrepreneurship is thus a vocation of fundamental importance, but 
Europe is not ‘entrepreneur-minded’ enough.” 
European Commission (2004) p.28 
 
Both of these arguments were followed by calls for greater tax subsidization of 
high technology investment, R&D expenditures and enhanced policies aimed at 
boosting entrepreneurship and new entry and reducing risk aversion and the 
“stigma of failure” (European Commission (2004)). 
 
In relation to enhancing the role of universities the policy emphasis on spin-offs 
and licensing “US style” is often noted; 
 
“In recent years, spurred by the experience of the US in particular, policy 
makers, enterprises, investors and academics throughout the industrialized 
world have paid increasing attention to the role of universities as drivers of 
innovation. Many universities have established formal offices and processes for 
identifying promising discoveries made within their walls and turning them into 
revenue streams through licensing or spin-outs.
 2“ 
Apax (2005) p.4 
 
The belief in the centrality of university-business links to economic progress 
and on the commercialisation of science through licensing and spin-offs is also 
explicit in the innovation strategies of many individual countries (OECD (2001) 
Yusuf and Nabeshima (2007)). 
 
In this paper I wish to question these emphases on R&D intensive high 
technology spin-offs from the science base and entrepreneurial science. In 
doing so it is not my intention to argue that R&D or new entry or the growth of 
venture capital or university spin-offs do not matter
3. My contention is rather 
that they have been greatly exaggerated to the neglect of other key factors when   3
one considers the innovation system as a whole. One of these factors is the 
importance of the diffusion and use of ICT as a general purpose technology 
beyond the ICT and other R&D intensive high-tech producing sectors. This has 
enabled “unexpected” user sectors with negligible conventional R&D spend 
such as retailing to dominate movements in US aggregate productivity growth. 
A second factor is the dominant role which performance transformation in 
existing firms plays in driving industry level productivity compared with the 
direct role of new entrants. A third is the diversified role played by universities 
in knowledge exchange which extends beyond a narrow focus on spin offs and 
licensing to encompass the creation of human capital and a wide range of 
formal and informal business interactions. A further factor related to this is the 
predominant role of customer supplier interactions in open innovation systems 
(Chesbrough (2003)) rather than direct university business interactions. Finally 
there is the major role that public procurement policy has played in the US in 
the effective provision of public rather than private sector venture capital and 
the high value placed by US firms on public sector sources of knowledge for 
innovation. The paper attempts in the space available to provide a broad 
overview of evidence on each of these factors and to consider some broad 
implications for innovation policy which might be drawn on the basis of that 
review. In particular it concludes by arguing that the crafting of innovation 
policy in the context of any specific national innovation system requires a 
careful consideration of the structural features of that context and the particular 
opportunities and challenges facing policy practitioners in it. An imperfect 
interpretation of the experience of one country’s system is unlikely to be an 
appropriate guide to innovation system failure or success elsewhere. 
 
Interpreting US Economic performance 
Since so much policy is linked to references to US economic performance it is 
useful to begin with a brief overview of it in the recent past. Table 1 shows that 
the most dramatic feature of United States’ performance since World War II is 
that its recent improvement is heavily concentrated at the end of the last century 
and at the beginning of this century, when it returned to its long run trend 
performance after two decades of relatively low growth performance. The 
dramatic improvements in productivity growth after 1995 are not, however, due 
to the direct performance of R&D intensive high technology industries.  
 
This can be seen if we decompose the aggregate performance into its 
components. An industry’s contribution to the aggregate depends on its own 
change in productivity growth, and on its size, because the economy is a 
weighted average of the different sectors.
4 
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Table 1.   US PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 1947-2003 
 
US Growth of real GDP per hour 
1947 – 1972        2.9% 
1972 – 1995        1.4% 
1995 – 2000        2.5% 
2000 – 2003        2.6% 
 
Source McKinsey Global Institute, (2001), Farrell, Bailey and Remes (2005) 
 
Decomposing productivity growth in the first period from 1995 to 2000 reveals 
that six of fifty-nine sectors accounted for the whole of the acceleration in 
productivity growth. The top three key sectors in the United States economy on 
this basis were wholesaling; retailing; and security and commodity broking. 
Their joint contribution was twice as great as the next three, which were 
electronic and electric equipment (semiconductors), industrial machinery and 
equipment (computers) and telecoms (McKinsey Global Institute (2001)). 
 
None of the top three are technology intensive sectors in any conventional sense. 
In the second period, the most recent years for which decomposition data are 
available, seven sectors accounted for 85% of all the productivity growth. These 
were retailing; finance and insurance; computer and electronic products; 
wholesaling; administrative and support services; real estate; and miscellaneous 
professional and scientific services. None of these, with the exception of 
computers and electronics, are in any sense conventionally R&D intensive 
(Farrell, Bailey and Remes (2005)). It’s a Wal-Mart not a Microsoft led 
turnaround. The traditionally identified R&D intensive sectors have not carried 
most weight. 
 
Wal-Mart, on the back of a major IT based business structure, has transformed 
– some people would argue much for the worse – a whole variety of social and 
economic structures in the United States and delivered enormous productivity 
growth in the retailing sector (McGuckin, Spiegelman and Ark (2005), Foster, 
Haltiwanger and Krizan (2002)). Much of this has been linked, as in other 
service sectors such as transport and financial services to the implementation of 
new business models based on ICT and related technologies (Hughes and Scott 
Morton (2005) (2006)). Wal-Mart’s performance is thus an example of the 
impact of ICT as a general purpose technology (OECD (2003a), Helpmann 
(1998)) in a ‘user’ rather than a high tech ‘producer’ sector (Pilat and Lee 
(2001)). Microsoft on the other hand is a high tech producer which contributes 
to the capacity for many of these changes to occur in the ‘user’ sectors. So in 
that sense Sam Walton and Bill Gates are complementary, Sam Walton and   5
Wal-Mart are more important to productivity turnaround than Bill Gates and 
Microsoft however, because of the scale of the activity which is transformed by 
the activities of a company such as Wal-Mart when it implements IT linked 
business transformations. Differences in services productivity growth, in fact, 
account for most of the difference in national productivity performance between 
the USA the UK and Europe in the past decade, rather than differences in high 
tech producing sectors (Oxford Institute of Retail Management (2004), Griffith 
and Harmgart (2005), Basu, Fernald, Oulton and Srinivasam (2003), van Ark, 
Inklaar and McGuckin (2002)). 
 
High technology “producing” sectors are a small part of the economy, 
especially compared to the technology using sectors and the services sector 
more generally. This points to the need to think extremely carefully about the 
mechanisms by which high technology activity is diffused through the rest of 
the economy and not just the scale or productivity performances of high 
technology output per se. A focus on high technology production without a 
parallel consideration of diffusion or use throughout the innovation system, and 
the factors affecting that runs a clear risk of failing to deliver the goods. 
 
Spin offs and new entry  
Now I want to turn to the issue of new spin offs and their role in productivity 
performance; I have called this the golden oldies versus the new kids on the 
block debate. The new kids on the block are new high tech spin off firms that 
are often attributed such an important role in the science and innovation process. 
I want to present some facts about spin offs, especially in the United States and 
put them in the context of what is known about the way in which the golden 
oldies contribute to changes in industry structure and productivity growth. 
 
The first thing is to get a sense of proportion. The United States economy has 
some 500,000 firms starting up each year. That, of course, includes firms of all 
kinds from small restaurants to boutique high tech businesses, not just 
businesses based on the exploitation of intellectual property or new products 
derived from advances in scientific research. In the US as a whole, in 2004 
there were 462 IP based start-ups where the IP was from a US university. That 
may be impressive performance internationally, but its scale has to be borne in 
mind in interpreting claims of what might be gained in other economies from 
such spin offs. 
 
Secondly, although IP produced by US universities produces results in 
considerable patenting and licensing activity, it’s insignificant numerically 
compared to the total amount of such research related activity in the United   6
States. IBM in the year 2005 alone registered 2,941 patents with the US Patent 
office, Canon 1829, and HP 1790. The whole of the University of California 
(UC) state system, which is one of the most dynamic, productive and innovative 
university systems in the world, produced 388, MIT 136 and Stanford 90 (US 
Patent Office (2005)). This is an impressive university performance. It is 
important, however, to keep it in perspective relative to corporate activity and to 
think of universities as a part of a wider system in which they are perhaps a 
quantitatively small but qualitatively important part
5.  
 
Finally, although there is evidence that university spin-offs are less likely to go 
bankrupt than other high-tech start-ups or new firms generally (Shane (2004)), 
the returns from surviving university start-ups and licensing activity are 
enormously skewed (Mowery et al (2004)). There are a couple of statistics 
which illustrate just how skewed. Only 167 out of 27,322 patents held by 193 
US university institutions in 2004 made over $1m (AUTM (2005)). In the case 
of Columbia University, Stanford and the UC system the top 5 patents 
accounted for 65% of gross licensing revenues. The chances of hitting a home 
run are small. That doesn’t mean to say you shouldn’t do it; in fact you can’t 
win the race unless you place a bet, but you have to be realistic about what the 
odds are. First mover new start-ups based on radical innovations capable of 
transforming markets very rarely come to dominate those new markets. In the 
terminology of Markides and Geroski such pioneering ‘colonisers’ of radical 
new markets rarely survive early market expansion. Fast second movers with 
rather difference ‘consolidations’ skills come to scale up dominate, and capture 
maximum value (Markides and Geroski (2005))
 6.Universities also have to be 
clear about the costs. The vast majority of US university technology licensing 
offices barely break even or don’t make a profit. The gross average annual 
licensing revenues of the UC system in 2001-4 of $75 million cost almost $60 
million per annum to maintain and manage. Thus in the period 2001-4 the net 
contribution of the University of California systems licensing income was $15 
million annually, compared to around $235 million of commercial funding of 
university research (Mowery (2007)). 
 
We can now look at this in a slightly broader way. Instead of just looking at the 
spin off activity by US based universities we can look at the impact of start-ups 
as a whole. A substantial amount of work has been done which attempt to 
decompose the change in productivity in particular industries across the OECD 
economies in terms of entry, exit and survivor growth (e.g. OECD (2003b), 
Bartelsmann, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004)). This work breaks down 
productivity growth between the gains in productivity that are made by the 
surviving firms which are there throughout the period studied and the transfer of 
activity from lower to higher productivity surviving firms. This is the golden   7
oldie effect. The firms are there at the beginning and they are there at the end. 
Then there’s the impact on productivity of firms that leave. If the worst firms 
drop out, there’s a batting average affect and average productivity rises. Finally 
there is the effect of new entries, the spin offs and new start ups. This is the new 
kids on the block effect. They enter the system and either die or survive and 
grow over the period analysed. What is clear from this work is that the vast 
majority of the productivity growth that is experienced in any economy and any 
industry in any time period is driven by the transformation in productivity of the 
golden oldies; that is, it’s the improvement in the performance of the firms that 
are there all the time. The contribution of survivors (often referred to as the 
‘within firms’ effect) varies between 55% and 95%. The net effect of exits and 
entry accounts for 20-40%, but most of this is due to the batting average effect 
of exits. Entry effects are small because of low entry sizes at lower average 
productivity than incumbents and low survival rates. Only 30-50% of new 
entrants survive for over 5 years. Exit and entry rates rise and fall together 
across countries and over time with high entry associated with high exit. In the 
case of the US the new entry component is typically large and negative, and 
survival rates are low but survivors on average grow faster. Finally, it is 
important to note that these studies do not suggest that the US is characterized 
by high net entry. Instead it appears that the US is characterized by relatively 
rapid growth of survivors, so it is post entry growth not entry per se that matters. 
To illustrate the effects we can look at some data from UK manufacturing for 
the period 1980-1992 (Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003)). The data relate to 
establishments which may operate a single plant and multi-plant establishments. 
Table 2 shows that net entry by singleton establishments accounted for only 
15.9% of overall productivity growth, whilst net entry due to the closure and 
opening of establishments by multi-plant surviving firms accounted for over 
twice as much (33.2%). Productivity growth within surviving establishments 
owned by multi-plant businesses accounted for over 44%. Golden Oldies, 
surviving firms, clearly dominate this process
7. They may also be the source of 
new spin-offs themselves: 
 
“successful start-ups almost always begin with an idea that has ripened in the 
research organization of a large company (or university). Any region without 
larger companies at the technology frontier or research organizations of large 
companies will probably have fewer companies starting or spinning off.” 
Gordon Moore (founder of Intel) cited in Branscomb and Auerswald (2002), p 44 
 
A policy stance which concentrates on driving innovation and productivity by 
looking only at new independent firms will therefore miss a very important part 
of the story. 
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Table 2. Net Entry, Surviving Firm and Reallocation Components of  
               UK Manufacturing Establishment Productivity Growth 1980-92 
 







productivity growth  0.6  44.6 
Market reallocation between 
survivors with high and low 
productivity levels  -0.4  3.9 
Market reallocation between 
survivors with high and low 
productivity growth  0.4  -2.8 
Net entry productivity effect  15.9  33.2 
 
Source: Calculated from Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003) 
 
There are some industries and there are some conditions which are relatively 
favourable to the success of innovative new entry (Baldwin and Gellatly (2003), 
Baldwin (1993), Gambardello and Malerba (1999), Audretsch (1995)). The first 
is where the nature of the technology is constantly changing the basis on which 
competitiveness can be built. If there is turbulence in the technological regime 
and entry is relatively low cost, experimentation in new entry may be 
accompanied by some home runs. Also, if the incumbents – the golden oldies – 
in an industry are heavily committed to an existing technology then there’s a 
better chance of a new entity succeeding because the conservatism that goes 
with very heavy investment in a standard technology makes the incumbents 
relatively slow to react (Christensen (1997)). Finally, the chances of success are 
higher if the resources to exploit new business ideas – complementary assets – 
are not owned by others. If these complementary assets, which are necessary to 
extract value, are owned by somebody else it is unlikely that they can be 
appropriated by new independent firms going it alone (Teece (1996)). 
 
The role to be expected for new innovative entry and survival to enhance 
productivity performance is thus highly context specific. A blanket promotion 
of new start-ups in support of innovation without careful attention to industry 
dynamics and the ecology linking new entry and large firm success, and 
patterns of appropriating value should be avoided
8. 
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Universities and the innovation system 
In discussing the role of universities in innovation systems I will illustrate my 
argument with data from a recent survey based comparison of the UK and US 
economies. The Centre for Business Research/Industrial Performance Centre 
(CBR/IPC) US UK Innovation Benchmarking Survey (Cosh, Hughes, Lester 
(2006)) was carried out in the period March-November 2004. The primary 
telephone survey covered firms of all sizes from 10 employees upwards in the 
manufacturing and business services sectors. It achieved response rates of 
18.7% in the US and 17.5% in the UK. There was in addition a postal follow-up 
survey in both countries for firms employing more than 1000 employees. In all, 
the survey instrument included 200 questions which generated over 300 
variables per firm. In this paper I will draw only on those sections of the survey 
instrument which related to the interactions between universities and the firms 
in the survey as well as drawing on some material on the wider range of 
interactions which survey firms claimed were relevant to their innovation 
activities. 
 
Table 3 shows the size distribution of the overall achieved samples in the UK 
and the US surveys. Approximately 2/3 of the firms in both surveys employ 
between 10 and 99 people, around 1/4 employ between 100 and 999 people, 
with the remainder employing over 1000. In order to provide UK US 
comparisons which are not contaminated by possible variations between 
countries in the distribution of responses by sector or by size of firm, I will 
focus on the results which are obtained when we form a matched sample. This 
matched sample consists of 1,149 US companies and 1,149 UK companies 
matched by employment size and by sector where the sectoral matching is at 
least at the three digit level. Table 4 shows the sectoral composition of this 
matched sample distinguishing between manufacturing and business services 
and high-tech and conventional sectors within those broad industrial groupings. 
The distinction between high-technology and conventional sectors is based on 
the R&D intensity of their activity and the technical composition of their labour 
force. The survey contains a representative proportion of high technology 
businesses in both countries. 
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Table 3.   Size Distribution of UK and US Respondent Firms in the  
                CBR/IPC Survey 
 
Employment Size  US  UK 
10-99 62%  66% 
100-999 24%  25% 
1000+ 14%  9% 
N 1540  2129 
Source: A. Cosh, A. Hughes and R. Lester UK PLC Just How Innovative Are We? 
 Cambridge MIT Institute 2005 
 
 
Table 4.   The Sectoral Composition of a Matched Sample of UK and US  
                 Firms 
 
 High-Tech  Conventional 
Manufacturing 28%  38% 
Business 
Services  15% 19% 
Source: A. Cosh, A. Hughes and R. Lester UK PLC Just How Innovative Are We? 
Cambridge MIT Institute 2005 
 
 
One way of looking at the role of university industry relationships is to locate 
universities as a source of knowledge for innovation in the wider context of the 
overall sources of knowledge used by innovation active firms. The results of an 
analysis of this kind for firms in the UK US matched sample are shown in 
Figure 1
9. The picture which emerges is very clear. Customers, suppliers, 
competitors and the firms’ own internal knowledge are the dominant knowledge 
sources. In both the USA and the UK universities are relatively low in 
frequency of use as direct sources of knowledge for innovation. Interestingly in 
terms of the proportion of firms reporting universities as a source of knowledge 
the UK outstrips the US. In both countries use is made of a very wide range of 
other sources. There is clearly a distributed innovation knowledge system and in 
terms of frequency of use universities are only a small direct part of it
10. This 
does not mean that they are not important, but it does mean that their 
contribution has to be seen in the context of a much wider and complex system 
of innovation information flows. This pattern is not unique to the US and the 
UK. The same is true for Australia for instance as is apparent from Figure 2 and 
for the EU more generally. 
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Figure 1.   Use of sources of knowledge for innovation (% companies) 
 
 
Figure 2.   Key sources of ideas or information for innovation in Australian 
innovating  
                  business 2001-2003 (% Companies) 
Sourc
e: Calculated from ABS (2006) 
 
It is of course possible that frequency of use may not be correlated with the 
importance placed upon the information obtained. The survey firms were also 
asked to indicate the value they placed upon the sources of knowledge as well 
as their use. The responses are summarised in Table 5 where following Swann 
(2006) we group sources into 3 broad categories. These are the company sector,   12
the public and private scientific knowledge base and a group of intermediating 
and regulatory organisations. Once again, in both countries the company 
sources dominate. Internal sources of knowledge plus knowledge obtained from 
suppliers and customers were ranked most highly as knowledge sources for 
innovation. In both countries they were followed by technical standards and 
health and safety regulations as important sources of knowledge from the 
intermediating and regulatory group. The need to contextualise innovation 
policy in the circumstances of particular countries, however, is highlighted by 
the fact that there are significant differences between the UK and the US in the 
value placed upon knowledge from the science base, and from the 
intermediating organisations other than standard settings and regulators. For 
instance US firms were almost twice as likely to place a high importance on 
knowledge gained from consultancies, government research laboratories and 
other public research laboratories, professional conferences and trade 
associations than were UK firms. Moreover, despite being more likely to cite 
universities as a source of knowledge UK firms more frequently placed a lower 
value on it than did US firms.  
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Table 5.    High importance of sources of knowledge (% of users of that 
                 source) 
 
 UK  US  ratio 
   %  %  (UK/US)x100
Company Sector          
Suppliers of equipment, materials, 
components, or software  41.5  49.2  84.4 
Internal knowledge within the company  79.9  84.5  94.6 
Clients or customers  60.9  53.5  113.7 
Knowledge within the group  59.4  50.7  117.1 
Competitors in your line of business  27.7  20.8  132.9 
Intermediating and Regulatory 
Organisations          
Consultants 12.5  26.2  47.7 
Professional conferences, meetings  14.6  23.9  61.2 
Trade associations  15.1  23.5  64.4 
Technical/trade press, computer databases  21.5  26.5  80.8 
Fairs, exhibitions  17.4  18.0  96.8 
Environmental standards and regulations  31.8  46.1  69.0 
Technical standards or standard setting bodies 34.6  40.2  86.1 
Health and safety standards and regulations  41.3  47.2  87.5 
Other public sector e.g. Business links, 
Government Offices  10.5 38.7  27.1 
Scientific Knowledge Base          
Government research organisations  6.6  24.7  26.6 
Private research institutes  7.2  22.9  31.5 
Commercial laboratories or R&D enterprises  12.2  28.4  43.0 
Universities/ higher education institutes  13.8  27.0  51.3 
 
 
Source: CBR/IPC UK US Innovation Benchmarking Survey 
 
Another difference between the UK and the US emerges if we probe a little 
more deeply into the patterns of combined use of sources of knowledge.   
1
4
Figure 3.  Combined Use of Sources of Knowledge for 
 
(a) 
Use of Sources of Knowledge for Innovation: % 




Use of at least one Company Source and no 
other Source: % Companies 
(c) 
Use of at least one Company Source and one 
intermediary Source and no others: % Companies 
(d) 
Use of at least one Source in each Group: % 
Companies 
Source based on CBR/IPC UK/US Innovation Benchmarking Survey   15
Figure 3 (following Swann (2006)) shows in successive quadrants the extent to 
which firms in the UK and the US are specialised in their use of sources of 
knowledge. The first upper left quadrant simply repeats in a different form the 
contents of Table 4 with the thickness of the bands reflecting the frequency of 
use of each source of knowledge. The top right-hand quadrant shows the 
proportion of companies in each country which used at least one source from 
the company sector, and no other sources. This reveals immediately that 
although customers, suppliers and competitors and the internal knowledge base 
of the firm are the most frequently used (and, as we have seen, the most highly 
valued source) they are almost never used in isolation. When we switch to the 
bottom left-hand quadrant we identify those firms which used at least one 
company source and at least one source from the intermediating and regulatory 
group and no others. Here a significant difference emerges between the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Over 40% of the US firms used a company 
source and an intermediary source and no others, whilst only 17% used this 
particular combination in the UK. When we turn finally to those companies 
which used at least one source in each group, then we find that the UK firms are 
far more likely to report using a research base source in combination with the 
other sources of knowledge in the company and intermediating sectors. It 
appears therefore that US firms are much more likely to combine company and 
intermediating sources, whilst UK firms have a much more diffuse use of 
knowledge sources. Equally US firms are less likely to use all three knowledge 
sources and have a more compact knowledge source pattern. Paradoxically, as 
we have already seen, when they do interact with institutions in the science base, 
they place a significantly higher value on the outcomes. This raises important 
questions about the extent to which the value placed upon the science base is 
enhanced by the use of intermediating institutions between the science base and 
companies themselves. It also raises the question of whether in the UK the use 
of so many sources raises difficulties of effective management and reduces their 
usefulness
11. In terms of innovation policy this points up the importance of paying 
attention to the particular structure of the innovation system in which the policy 
is to be introduced and an analysis of whether the particular patterns observed, 
for instance in the United States, are linked to a superior pattern of innovation 




Having looked at the structural position of universities in knowledge flows in 
the innovation system it is important to discuss the nature of the interactions 
between universities and firms. As a pre-cursor to looking at some of the 
university data arising from the US UK survey which bear on this issue it is 
worthwhile setting out a typology of interactions.   16
First, universities educate and produce skilled graduates. Second through their 
research and dissemination activities, universities increase codified knowledge. 
University staff publish books and scientific papers, they patent, and in 
engineering faculties may develop proto-types. A very wide range of problem 
solving activities are also carried out – often on a regional or local basis, but 
sometimes on an international basis – directly addressing problems which are 
brought to the attention of the universities through contract research, co-
operative research, and faculty consulting. University laboratories may have 
equipment which can be used for testing various kinds of commercial 
equipment. These three kinds of activities are captured in Figure 3 under the 
headings of educating people, increasing the stock of codified knowledge and 
problem solving. 
 
What tends to be less discussed is what Richard Lester and Michael Piore have 
called the public space function of universities (Lester and Piore (2004)) which 
is captured in the fourth box in Figure 3. This function captures the distinctive 
role of universities in society and in the innovation system as public spaces in 
which other interested parties can “play”, if that public space is appropriately 
structured. This includes a range of “soft”, but none-the-less extremely 
important activities, to do with network forming, stimulating social interaction, 
influencing the direction of research processes by identifying commonly 
experienced problems, setting standards of a technical kind, setting up 
entrepreneurial centres and so on. These public space activities permit the 
discovery of potential complementary interests and the crafting of potential 
ways to develop them to mutual advantage. They also foster the role of 
universities as translators and providers of insights into “new” science. For 
instance in the context of the US Advanced Technology Program industrial 
research participants perceived that  
 
“the university could provide research insight that is anticipatory of further 
research problems and that it could be an ombudsman anticipating and 
communicating to all parties the complex nature of the research being 
undertaken.” 
Hall, Link and Scott (2003) p 491   17
Figure 3. The University role is multi-faceted 
 
Source: A. Cosh, A. Hughes and R. Lester UK PLC Just How Innovative Are We? Cambridge MIT Institute 2006 
 
It is interesting to explore how these diverse public spaces and other roles are 
perceived by businesses, and the relative significance of licensing and spinout 
formation compared to other interactions. The CBR/IPC Survey sheds some 
useful light here since respondent firms were asked how they interacted with the 
universities in their innovation activities and what kind of emphasis they placed 
on different interactions. Figure 4 reports the results. It shows that businesses 
interact across the full spectrum of those elements set out in Figure 3. The most 
frequent form of interaction is via informal contacts, and it’s not only the most 
frequent – a separate analysis (not shown here) reveals that it is also amongst 
the most highly valued (Cosh Hughes and Lester (2006)). All the conventional 
modes of university output (undergraduates and graduates, and publications and 
conferences) are frequently cited modes of interaction. In that sense there is no 
necessary conflict between how the business community says it interacts most 
with university activities and what academics themselves typically say they 
want to do. 
 
From the point of view of differences between systems of innovation it is worth 
noting that US firms appear to use internships more than their UK 
counterparts
13  and that they more frequently have an interaction involving 
innovation related expenditure with universities. This suggests a greater depth 
and intensity of interaction in the US than in the UK even if US interaction is 
less frequent. US firms are, however, less, not more, likely to interact via 
licensing, whether exclusive or non-exclusive. However, when they interact via 
licensing they value it more highly (Cosh, Hughes and Lester (2005)). 
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Figure 4. Types of University-Industry Interaction contributing to  
                 Innovation (% Companies) 
 
 
It is important to note that these are aggregate figures across manufacturing and 
business services. In some industries, in particular biomedical sciences, 
patenting and licensing are significant in terms of frequency of use and 
qualitative importance (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2002).  
 
From the point of view of innovation policies outside the USA it is instructive 
to note the intensification of patenting and licensing regimes in US universities 
has provoked a reaction. This reaction emphasises the threats posed to the cost 
and timeliness of effective knowledge exchange and exploitation. In non-
biomedical sciences in particular it has been argued that the time and costs 
involved in negotiating IP have begun to threaten industrially funded research 
(Mowery (2007)). Recent research suggests that major US universities are 
shifting knowledge exchange management beyond patent and licensing to avoid 
possible adverse reactions on the wider range of interactions. This includes 
managing wider industrial liaison activities alongside patenting. It also includes 
negotiating royalty free licences in some areas as part of industrial funding of 
research contracts in, for instance, electrical engineering and computer science 
(Mowery (2007)). If the ‘US Model” is to guide innovation policy elsewhere it 
is as well that the current evolving model rather than the ‘old’ one is a reference 
point and the full range of interactions is recognised. 
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Public Policy and Venture Capital 
I now want to turn to the issue of venture capital in the United States, and the 
view that what is required outside the US is subsidisation of private sector 
venture capital to promote a more risk tolerant investment climate. My first 
point here is that in practice in the United States, one of the most powerful, 
proactive venture capital supporting activities is public R&D procurement 
through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program (Connell 
(2006)). The SBIR was established in the 1980s in the middle of the period of 
very low United States productivity growth, when the United States 
experimented with a range of industrial policy mechanisms to counteract what it 
perceived, correctly, as its failure to deal with the threat commercially of 
Germany and Japan.  
 
The SBIR was one of a number of initiatives taken in the course of the 1980s to 
address this challenge. Many were designed to encourage collaborative and 
cooperative strategies in relation to innovation policy and productivity 
performance (Dertouzos, Lester and Solow (1989), Branscomb, Kodama and 
Florida (1999), Wessner (2003)). Thus, for example, the 1984 National 
Cooperative Research Act relaxed anti-trust regulations to facilitate research 
joint venture collaborations. In relation to university industry links the 1988 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act established, inter alia, the Advanced 
Technology Programme to promote university industry collaboration. In 1980 
the passage of the Bayh Dole Act was designed to enhance university patenting 
and licensing based on federally funded research. In the course of the 1980s 
several hundred university industry research centres were also established. By 
1990 such centres accounted for over $2.5 billion in academic R&D spending 
(see for example Branscomb et al (1999), Cohen et al (1998), Mowery (2007))
14. 
 
The SBIR as part of these policy initiatives was specifically established to 
support businesses with less than 500 employees, and provides 100% funded 
contracts to carry out technologically intensive R&D contractual obligations for 
US Federal Agencies. The US Federal Agencies advertise technical or research 
related problems and an open competition results in the award of a contract with 
potential follow-on contracts. The US government currently mandates 2½% of 
Federal Agency total R&D spend to SBIR, and that is in absolute terms a 
significant sum. It amounts to $2 billion annually, covering 4,000 contracts 
(Connell (2006)). The venture capital sector in the US, for comparison was 
investing around $1 billion annually in around 200 deals per annum at the seed 
stage in the period 2005 to 2006 and around $4 billion annually in around 800 
larger early stage deals. This was out of a total annual amount invested in all 
stages of around $24 billion in those years (Money Tree (2007)). The venture 
capital sector in the US is thus similar in its risk profile to private equity   20
elsewhere with a focus on later stage investments and large scale company 
buyouts. Only a small proportion of funding goes into seed and early stage 
finance. If an upper bound estimate of overall US investment in early stage 
technological development, including investment by larger corporation, is 
considered, formal venture capital accounts for 2.3% of funding compared with 
47.2% by business from internal funds, 23.9% by angels, 3.9% by universities 
and 22.7% by federal and state government (Branscomb and Auerswald 
(2002)).Within this overall picture the SBIR produces a situation in which a lot 
of the very risky early stage and seed investments are supported by a public 
sector mandated activity. Some extremely big and successful companies have 
been assisted in this way. Amgen, Qualcomm, and Genzyme, for instance, all 
have SBIR connections in their origins (Connell (2006)). The SBIR effectively 
derisks subsequent investment by providing certification and proof of 
performance capacity in the earlier stages of development for small firms that 
win these contracts. The balance of evaluation evidence also suggests that SBIR 
contract winners are more likely to commercialise on the basis of their research 
and to grow faster than similar firms not funded through SBIR contracts (Lerner 
(1999), Audretsch (2002) (2003), Audretsch, Link and Scott (2002), Wessner 
(2001), Wallstein (2000)). 
 
Overall Conclusions 
So, what are the overall lessons to draw from this broad overview? The first is 
that US productivity and growth performance is not based solely on high tech 
production per se; it’s based on the diffusion of innovations throughout the 
system and frequently on the transformation of what people would regard as 
“low tech” sectors (in R&D terms) by general purpose high technologies based 
on ICT advances. Secondly, productivity gains are in general driven by firms 
that are in existence. Thinking about existing firms and their innovation 
performance is critically important in the innovation process. Innovation policy 
should not focus on start-ups alone. Moreover, the role that start-ups may play 
is conditioned by the nature of particular technological regimes and patterns of 
appropriability. It is better to think in terms of typologies of commercialisation 
and knowledge exchange in which new firms entry and independent growth is 
one of several potential routes. New firms and spin-offs have an important seed 
bed role to play but need to be understood as part of a wider open innovation 
system in which the interplay between large and small firms and the 
transformations in large business process drive innovation and productivity. 
Thirdly, public sector procurement has potentially a very powerful part to play 
in supporting private venture capital and bridging the highest risk gap for early 
stage development of research intensive firms. Fourth, universities have to be 
seen as part of a complex system. Their direct contribution as a knowledge 
source is perceived in general by business as relatively small compared to other   21
components in the innovation system. Their role must be understood within this 
wider context and is multifaceted. The mechanisms for university interaction 
with business are diverse and may be sector specific. Licensing and spin offs 
are only one part of the story. They are significant in only some sectors and if 
aggressively pursued may lead to loss of other forms of research funding from 
business, and high rates of spin-off failure respectively. A ‘one size fits all’ 
economic development or innovation strategy for any country or any university 
which focuses on licensing and spin-offs alone is not appropriate. An 
innovation policy which promotes ‘public space’ interactions is likely to lead 
through informal and other interactions to the discovery and development of 
appropriate interaction modes for particular sectors and purposes. 
 
University research is of value and interest to the business sector because it is 
different. Creating institutional mechanisms which promote access to the space 
within which this different activity is pursued in turn creates the opportunity for 
the translation of scientific advance focused problem solving and the 
recognition and potential exploitation of commercialisation opportunities. If the 
innovation cargo is to be delivered the design and nature of such spaces, their 
adequacy and hence whether there are innovation systems failure in their 
provision should be high on the agenda in designing policy for “open” 
innovation systems.   22
Notes 
 
1 The study of cargo cults has long engaged anthropologists and their physical 
manifestations are well established (Worsley (1957)). There is a long and 
continuing controversy as to their interpretation and meaning in the cultures in 
which they occur (Jarvie (1964), Lindstrom (1993), Jebens (2004)), and the 
term cargo cult is now, if anything, more used outside than inside the discipline 
of anthropology. This is principally a result of the adoption of the term by the 
scientist Richard Feynman to describe as “cargo cult science” scientific 
investigations which fail to deliver the scientific cargo because whilst 
apparently following all the correct forms and structures of scientific 
investigation they miss out on a key ingredient. That key ingredient is due 
consideration of all the evidence against as well as for a hypothesis (Feynman 
(1985)). The argument in this paper is in a similar spirit.  
2 Whilst noting the influence of this interpretation of the US model the Apax  
report contains a good discussion of the wide range of interactions between 
universities and the business sector beyond licensing and spin-offs which are 
necessary to effect knowledge exchange. Hughes (2007) discusses these 
arguments in the more specific context of UK science and innovation policy. 
3 For an overview of university spin-off contributions see, for example, Shane 
(2004). 
4 More formally, the contribution of sector i to aggregate productivity growth  i C  






















0  where  i Y

 and  i L

  are sectoral output and employment 
growth rates over the period 0 to 1, 
Y
Yi , and 
L
Li  are the sectors’ shares in output 
and employment in period 0 and  o L  and  1 L  are levels of national employment in 
time periods 0 and 1 (McKinsey Global Institute (2001)). 
5 Patent statistics are subject to a number of problems in assessing performance. 
Companies may patent for strategic reasons, and this strategic significance 
varies across sectors (see for example Hall (2004)). The broad 
university/industry picture is, however, clear enough. It is less clear whether the 
quality of university patents has risen or fallen as their numbers have risen 
(Sampart, Mowery and Ziedonins (2003), Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
(1998)). 
6 From an innovation system point of view this points to the importance of 
understanding the interactions between types of firms and the complementary 
between spin-offs as a seed-bed of new ideas and the role of subsequent 
acquisition or replacement by fast second movers.   23
 
7 It should be noted that the interpretation in the text is rather different from that 
drawn by the authors who emphasise new entry effects. They choose to regard 
as ‘new entry’ new plants introduced by existing multi establishment businesses. 
This is clearly not new entry in the sense of new independent firms. Most new 
plants which open and survive are built by surviving multi-plant firms (the 
golden oldies). 
8 It has been argued that focus on independent growth by new start-ups rather 
than their acquisition and integration by established firms is also questionable, 
given the relative strengths of large firms in exploiting or scaling up radical 
innovations pioneered by new firms (Markides and Gersoki (2005)). 
9  The eighteen sources identified are consistent with a number of previous 
innovation surveys including the European Community Harmonised Innovation 
Survey and the periodic survey of the Small Business Sector in the UK carried 
out by the CBR since 1991. 
10 These results are similar to results obtained for the United States in the well-
known 1994 Carnegie Mellon survey, (see for example Cohen, Nelson and 
Walsh (2002)). 
11 It is interesting to note that an analysis of European Community Harmonised 
Innovation data shows an inverted U-shaped relationship between innovation 
performances and the number knowledge sources used. (Laursen and Salter 
(2006). 
12  The CBR/IPC Survey also reveals that US firms support these university 
interactions with a greater commitment of resources than is the case in the UK 
(Cosh, Lester and Hughes (2005)). 
13 They also value them more highly (Cosh, Hughes and Lester (2006). 
14 In addition to specific policy initiatives there is also abundant evidence which 
points to the important role played by federal expenditures, foreign policy 
related military expenditures generally and the (Defense) Advanced Research 
Project Agency (DARPA) in particular. This includes for example their role in 
emergence of the internet, computing and IT as a general purpose technology 
(Flamm (1987), Segaller (1998), Mowery and Rosenberg (1998)); the 
development of Silicon Valley (Lécuyer (2006)) and the impact of defence 
expenditure more generally on the structure and funding of basic applied 
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